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Abstract 
This paper reviews the literature on incubators in developed and developing countries. We show that the 
concept of incubators has evolved in time according to market and firm needs. Contemporary successful 
incubators are profit-oriented, provide a wide range of services, focus more on intangible business 
services, and employ qualified managers and support staff. By drawing lessons from country experiences 
we assess the appropriateness of incubators as a tool for entrepreneurship promotion in developing 
countries. The main weaknesses of incubators in developing countries are: (i) focus on tangible services 
rather than intangible services, (ii) dependence on government, (iii) lack of management and qualified 
personnel, (iv) lack of incubator planning and creativeness in solving problems. Most successful 
incubators display a creative and innovative character in approaching problems of tenant companies. This 
is of course correlated with the quality of the incubator management staff. Moreover, incubators reflect 
the institutional set-up, creativity, and policy innovativeness in a society. Therefore policy on incubators 
should be well-integrated with other policies for entrepreneurship promotion and economic development, 
such as education and institutional deregulation.  
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Incubators encourage firms to become innovative and competitive. Such a mission can be pursued only if 
incubators themselves become competitive, business-oriented, and innovative. 
ANPROTEC  National Advanced Technology Enterprise Promoter Entity 
BDS    Business development services 
BIC   Business innovation centre 
CPI   Corporate private incubator 
EDC   Entrepreneurship development cell 
EU   European Union 
GDP   Gross domestic product 
IASP   International Association of Science Parks 
ICT   Information and communication technology 
IPI   Independent private incubator 
IPR   Intellectual property rights 
KOSGEB  Small and medium enterprises development organization  
MOST   Ministry of Science and Technology  
NBIA   National Business Incubation Association 
NITS   Núcleos de Inovação Tecnológica 
NSTED   National Science and Technology Entrepreneurship Development Board 
PACTI   Industry Technological Training Support Programme 
PNI   National incubation support program  
R&D   Research and development 
SEBRAE   Micro and small business support services 
S&T   Science and technology  
SME   Small and medium enterprise 
STEP   Entrepreneurs Park 
TBI   Technology business incubator 
TEKMER  Technology Development Centres 
TORCH   High Technology Industry Development Centre 
UBI   University business incubator 
UK    United Kingdom 
UN   United Nations 
US   United States 
URP   University research park 
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1 Introduction 
Researchers, industry experts, and government officials increasingly highlight the role that small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) play in creating income and employment. Because of their 
flexible structure SMEs quickly adapt to changes in the economic environment and technology 
and as such small firms are the cornerstone in policymaking regarding new venture and job 
creation. For instance, about 94 per cent of all firms are small (<100 employees) in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and Japan (Doi and Cowling 1998); 93 per cent of all European Union (EU) 
firms have less than 10 employees (European Commission 2000); Chinese small firms account 
for about 90 per cent of all firms and about 67 per cent of all firms with any Science and 
Technology (S&T) activity (Lundin et al. 2006); micro enterprises (< 10 employees) make up 96 
per cent of the all firms and employ over 45 per cent of the economically active population in 
Peru (Jäckle and Li 2006). Many politicians believe and economists have the intuition that new 
possibilities for growth, innovation, and job creation will come from new ventures (Wennekers 
and Thurik 1999). However, small and new ventures have several disadvantages that most 
entrepreneurs face. They cannot benefit from scale economies both from the output and input 
side. Small size is an important constraint for process and product innovations, which are the 
core of recent competitiveness (European Commission 2001). Moreover, difficulties in gaining 
access to tangible and intangible resources, limited access to scientific knowledge, poor 
management skills, and lack of know-how hamper survival rates among (high tech) new ventures 
(Allen and Rahman 1985; Smilor and Gill 1986; Miller and Cote 1987; Nowak and Grantham 
2000; Gassman and Becker 2006; Peters et al. 2004)1. These drawbacks that are common to 
entrepreneurs and new ventures in most developed countries are exacerbated in developing 
countries due to additional impeding factors, such as lack of human capital, high macroeconomic 
volatility, and poor functioning formal institutions.  
 
Incubators provide an attractive framework to practitioners in dealing with the difficulties in the 
process of entrepreneurship summarized above. They can be considered as a remedy for the 
disadvantages that small and new firms encounter by providing numerous business support 
services and they are useful in fostering technological innovation and industrial renewal (Allen 
and Rahman 1985; Similor and Gill 1986; Allen and McCluskey 1990; Mian 1996a). They can 
be viewed as a mechanism (i) to support regional development through job creation (Allen and 
Levine 1986; Mian 1997; Thierstein and Wilhelm 2001; Roper 1999), (ii) for new high tech 
venture creation, technological entrepreneurship, commercialization, and transfer of technology 
(Mian 1994, 1997; Phillips 2002; McAdam and McAdam 2008), (iii) an initiative to deal with 
market failures relating to knowledge and other inputs of innovative process (Colombo and 
Delmastro 2002). Studies have showed that one third of new firms do not survive the third year 
and about 60 per cent do not survive the seventh year (OECD 2002). This number considerably 
falls to 15–20 per cent among incubator tenants (Bruton 1998; Adegbite 2001; Lalkaka 2002; 
Abetti 2004). For these reasons many countries have increasingly been engaged in establishing 
incubators. It is estimated that there are around 3500 incubators worldwide, one third are located 
                                                 
1
 Most of the problems that entrepreneurs face are underpinned in the market failure argument which justifies the 
need for incubators. However incubators can be driven by other theoretical approaches such as the real options 
view and the resource based view. For a summary of these different approaches see Hackett and Dilts (2004a).   
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in North America, about 30 per cent in Europe, and the remaining 40 per cent in developing 
countries of which most are in Brazil and China.  
 
This paper’s purpose is to discuss the rationale for the adoption of incubators in developing 
countries. As such the discussion elaborates questions, like what particular benefits can 
incubators provide for entrepreneurs and small companies? What factors (resources) are 
important in a successful incubator model? Can developing countries sufficiently harness 
tangible and intangible resources for the success of incubators?  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a thorough review of the literature on 
the impact of incubators on entrepreneurship and economic development. We focus on the 
indicators that are used to assess the performance of incubators and summarize the evaluation 
results that have been conducted so far. This section also provides a novel typology of incubators 
and argues that the concept of incubators has evolved over time contrary to what current 
literature claims (e.g. Grimaldi and Grandi 2005). In Section 3, we provide country case studies 
to illustrate different approaches in developing countries. In Section 4 we briefly discuss the 
requirements for successful incubation in developing countries. Section 5 evaluates the overall 
appropriateness of the incubator model for developing countries and identifies questions for 
further research.  
2 Review of the incubators literature  
It is appropriate to classify the growing literature on incubators into two broad categories. The 
first set of studies deals with the theory of the incubators and the incubator model and seeks 
answers to questions, such as how incubators are formed, what their aims are, how they are 
planned, and how they are managed (e.g. Similor and Gill 1986; Allen and McCluskey 1990; 
Nowak and Grantham 2000; Grimaldi and Grandi 2005; Aernoudt 2004; Leblebici and Shah 
2004; Becker and Gassmann 2006). The second set of studies evaluates incubators regarding 
certain factors that define success indicators. These papers mainly focus on whether incubators 
have achieved their economic and technological goals in supporting entrepreneurs and small 
companies and their wider goals in encouraging creation of new firms and jobs and establishing 
an entrepreneurial society (e.g. Mian 1996a; Colombo and Delmastro 2002; Peters et al. 2004; 
Rothaermel and Thursby 2005a, 2005b; Aerts et al. 2007; McAdam and McAdam 2008). Section 
2.1 focuses on the former set. The latter is discussed in section 2.2. 
2.1 Brief history and typology of incubators  
The main focus in this study is the concept of (technology) incubators. There are many 
derivatives that spun out from the concept of science parks and incubators. For this reason it is 
better to define both at this stage. The International Association of Science Parks (IASP) defines 
a science park as: ‘…an organization managed by specialized professionals, whose main aim is 
to increase the wealth of its community by promoting the culture of innovation and the 
competitiveness of its associated businesses and knowledge-based institutions’. To enable these 
goals, a science park (i) stimulates and manages the flow of knowledge and technology amongst 
universities, R&D institutions, companies, and markets, (ii) facilitates the creation and growth of 
innovation-based companies through incubation and spin-off processes, and (iii) provides other 
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value-added services together with high quality space and facilities. For instance, University 
Research Park (URP) is a derivative of this concept. The main differences are the contractual 
and/or formal ownership or operational relationship with a university and the focus on transfer of 
technology and promotion of R&D under university-industry partnership. On the other hand 
National Business Incubation Association (NBIA) defines business incubation as ‘…a dynamic 
process of business enterprise development which: (i) nurture young firms; help them to survive 
and grow during the start-up period when they are most vulnerable, (ii) provide hands-on 
management assistance, access to financing and orchestrated exposure to critical business or 
technical support services, and (iii) offer entrepreneurial firms shared office services, access to 
equipment, flexible leases, and expandable space—all under one roof’. The most important 
element that identifies incubators from the rest of similar establishments is that, it provides high 
level business support/management services under one roof for entrepreneurs and new ventures 
that have (medium) high level technological focus to create synergy (e.g. Allen and McCluskey 
1990; Aerts et al. 2007).2   
 
As stated before, this paper covers the literature on incubators. We do not provide detailed 
definitions of other forms, such as technopark, industrial parks, technopolis, etc. All these 
establishments share similar characteristics and vary on relatively minor points. The differences 
between various definitions and forms could easily be analysed with the help of Figure 1 where 
different derivatives are placed on a continuum from low to high management support services 
and from low to high technological level. Most of the contemporary incubators originate from 
multipurpose business incubators and business centres that have been established in the 1970s. 
These days incubators have a highly selective admission criteria and provide hands-on business 
and management assistance for new ventures that are higher in technological continuum and 
have a high potential to generate revenue and create jobs. The incubator, as understood in the 
current terminology, is represented in the gray shaded area in Figure 1.    
2.1.1 Development of the incubation idea 
It is widely accepted that the first incubator was created by Joseph Mancuso in Batavia, New 
York in 1957 on a former Massey–Ferguson facility (Leblebici and Shah 2004; O’Neal 2005). 
The incubator movement was initiated by the managers of the incubators in the United States 
(US) through a series of conferences in the mid-1980s sponsored by the US Small Business 
Administration (Allen and McCluskey 1990). Incubators differed from the existing industrial 
parks and estates as the focus shifted away from real estate development and subsidized rents to 
value-added business services (O’Neal 2005). These developments finally led to the foundation 
of NBIA in 1985, with 40 founding members. Figure 2 depicts the number of incubators 
established in the developed and developing world in five-year intervals starting from the 1960s.  
 
                                                 
2
 This is also what differentiates incubators from business development services (BDS) such as training, capacity 
building, fund raising, etc. BDS could be provided by any company or institution for profit or not for-profit. 
However providing these services under one roof is only a tool for incubators to achieve new venture and 
technology creation and create synergies.   
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Figure 1: Identifying incubators among other forms of similar establishments 
 
 
One can categorize incubators either according to their funding scheme (sponsors) (e.g. Becker 
and Gassmann 2006) or according to their main objectives (e.g. Aernoudt 2004). Despite 
numerous typologies in a similar manner, there is still no theoretical study that aims at merging 
these two seemingly separate typologies. This paper makes an attempt in this direction. The basic 
framework is presented in Figure 3. The vertical dimension locates incubators on a continuum 
from non-profit to for-profit. The horizontal scale represents incubator objectives ranging from 
traditional (new venture creation, job creation, economic development) to specific (transfer of 
technology, sector-specific objectives). The gray line represents the total number of incubators 
established through time as depicted in Figure 2. Leblebici and Shah (2004) identify the period 
1960–84 as the origin of the industry.  
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Figure 2: Number of incubators established in developed and developing world 
 
 
First generation incubators aimed at job creation and new venture creation that are catalysts for 
economic development (Hackett and Dilts 2004b; Aernoudt 2004; Leblebici and Shah 2004). For 
instance, the first phase of growth (10 per cent yearly growth rate on average) of the incubators 
in the US between 1984 and 1990 was a reflection of the economic downturn of the US 
economy. After a slow diffusion of incubators from the 1960s to 1984, during the first phase of 
growth, massive public funding was directed to incubators as a remedy for unemployment and 
firm failure (Leblebici and Shah 2004). The movement toward creating university technology 
incubators and the favourable image of incubators enhanced this trend. The number of incubators 
rose to 400 only in the US and industry experts estimated about 1000 incubators around the 
world by 1990 (Allen and McCluskey 1990). These factors played quite an important role in 
sustaining incubators as an important tool for promoting entrepreneurship. In this period most 
incubators were publicly financed and most aim at economic development by industrial renewal 
and creating jobs.   
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Figure 3: Typology and the evolution of incubators 
 
 
The incubation industry reached a level of maturity in the following five-year period. In the mid-
1990s the number of newly established incubators in developed countries slowed down. This was 
mainly because of the problems in the incubation process. Most incubators were providing 
similar low quality management advice and business support services without any exit 
restrictions. The credibility of incubators was restored in the second half of the 1990s which 
could be labelled as a deepening of the industry. The development of the new high tech economy 
stimulated this process and led to the creation of sector-specific incubators (Hackett and Dilts 
2004b) and virtual internet incubators that aimed at stimulating networking among high tech 
start-ups (e.g. Nowak and Grantham 2000).3 Another factor that enhanced this second growth 
wave was the adoption of the concept in many developing countries such as China, Brazil, India, 
Malaysia, and Turkey as can be seen in Figure 2. One third of the existing incubators in 
developing countries were established from the early 1990s to 2000. It is now estimated that 
                                                 
3
 There are three other factors that played a role in this trend as suggested by Hackett and Dilts (2004b): (i) the 
Bayh–Dole Act in the US that reduced the risk and uncertainty of commercializing publicly funded research, (ii) 
the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) system and the recognition of the role of R&D and innovation, and (iii) the 
commercialization of bio-medical research. The collapse of the dot.com market slowed this trend and wiped off 
virtual incubators. However, the general trend in the industry was not affected from this development.  
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around 40 per cent of all existing incubators are in developing countries (European Commission 
2002).  
2.1.2 Financing incubators 
The next generation incubators are expected to be for-profit and sector-specific. The founder and 
the first director of the NBIA, Carlos Morales, argues that for-profit incubators are expected to 
grow to about half the total number of all incubators in the coming years (paraphrased in Nowak 
and Grantham 2000). Becker and Gassmann (2006) show the increasing trend of corporate 
incubators with a thorough typology of for-profit incubators. For-profit incubators could be 
organized as independent entities or they could operate under a parent corporation. Their major 
purpose is to generate a revenue for their owners which could be done in various ways such as 
charging fees for services provided or the incubator could invest in the businesses of individual 
tenants. For-profit incubators also support corporations in achieving technological as well as 
economic goals such as developing innovative products and processes. Given the market failure 
argument behind establishing incubators the label ‘for-profit’ might sound odd. However, the 
idea of for-profit incubators is compatible with the market failure argument. New and small 
ventures have problems to reach resources, funding, and knowledge. Firms may select to receive 
assistance for specialized services provided by an incubator but in return have to give up shares 
or pay for these services. In this case all the services are provided and organized within an 
incubator and the only difference is that services have monetary costs. The benchmarking study 
in EU countries shows that for-profit incubators constitute about 25 per cent of all incubators in 
Europe, ranging from 38 per cent in Italy to 18 per cent in France (European Commission 2002). 
In the US this number is about 15–20 per cent.  
 
In developing countries most incubators are still funded by the government and the for-profit 
idea is yet to develop. There is no clear cut information on how much governments spend on 
incubators because most funding available for incubator promotion is integrated to other major 
funding programmes.4 For instance, many incubators are supported by the EU through EU 
structural funds and regional development funds. International institutions such as the World 
Bank and UNDP have only a modest role in financing incubators in the developing world.5 
However, a recent initiative led to the establishment of infoDev managed by the World Bank 
specifically aiming at the promotion and establishment of incubators in developing countries. 
The programme aims at stimulating innovation in developing countries by establishing 
incubators that assist new technology-oriented ventures especially in Information and 
Communication Technology (ICT), (Scaramuzzi 2002).6 Section 4 gives more information 
regarding how incubators are financed in developing countries.  
                                                 
4
 For instance, in the UK ₤50 million are yearly available via the Government National Innovation Fund. 
However, how much exactly is spent on incubators is not clearly documented. In a recent speech the new US 
president Obama declared that US$250 million will be invested in business incubation each year.       
5
 It is known that UNDP has supported incubator projects in several countries, including Turkey, Romania, Egypt, 
Uzbekistan, Colombia, and Pakistan. Regional development banks such as the Asian Development Bank also 
supported incubation projects for instance in the Kyrgyz Republic. 
6
 For more information and a list of projects that are supported by InfoDev see 
http://www.infoDev.org/businessincubation 
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2.1.3 Incubation is an evolutionary idea 
As stressed earlier this paper suggests that the definition and the forms of incubators have 
evolved through time according to the need of the firms and the economic climate. Figure 3 
reflects this with a rough correlation between the introduction of new incubator models and the 
number of incubators established each year. In this sense we contradict to Grimaldi and Grandi 
(2005) who identified two incubating models comparing four types of incubators: Business 
Innovation Centres (BICs), University Business Incubators (UBIs), Independent Private 
Incubators (IPIs), and Corporate Private Incubators (CPIs). Model 1 aims at reducing start-up 
costs for new ventures anchored in old economy targeting local markets by providing various 
business support services. Model 2, on the other hand, aims at accelerating start-up process of 
aggressive, high value-added, high tech companies by providing both technological and 
management assistance. They argue that the emergence of the second model does not represent a 
linear evolving process or an improvement of Model 1. Our view is more in line with Leblebici 
and Shah (2004) who argue in narrative theory perspective that the concept of non-profit 
incubators in the 1970s has been re-invented in the late 1990s for the new techno era. The long 
term evolution of incubators reveals that the concept has evolved from a simple tool for 
economic development into a high tech, sector-specific and increasingly profit-oriented tool to 
promote entrepreneurship.    
2.2 Value-added contributions of incubators 
There are a number of studies in the literature that evaluate the usefulness of the incubators by 
assessing their value-added contributions. Appendix table A1 lists scholarly articles that assess 
incubator performance for various countries. One fact that makes the assessment challenging is 
the selection of appropriate criteria. On what grounds can an incubator be labelled as successful? 
Answering this question requires a brief summary of the aims of establishing incubators. 
Incubators are established and supported for different reasons:  
 
1. To reduce start-up and early stage operational costs, and the risk of doing business by 
providing a protective environment for start-ups. (Similor and Gill 1986; Allen and 
Rahman 1985; Allen and McCluskey 1990; Lalkaka 2002; Hannon 2005). Most 
incubators offer managerial and administrative assistance as well as physical 
infrastructure to their tenants. Previous studies showed that incubator services are 
important for tenant firms (Mian 1997). For instance, Adegbite (2001) argues that one of 
the main reasons behind the low performance of Nigerian incubators is poor and 
insufficient incubator services. Especially managerial assistance could be an asset to 
entrepreneurs who lack managerial skills.  
2. As a means of regional (technology) development policy. Incubators were used as an 
effective policy tool in various countries for reducing unemployment, new job and 
venture creation. See for instance, Thierstein and Wilhelm (2001) for the German case, 
Frenkel et al., (2008) and Roper (1999) for the Israeli case and Abetti (2004) for the case 
of Finland. 
3. Enhancing university-industry collaboration via university incubators. Especially in the 
mid-1990s incubators were established with the aim of increasing commercialization of 
research and transfer of technology. See for instance, Mian (1996a, 1996b, 1997); 
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Phillips (2002) and Rothaermel and Thursby (2005a, 2005b) for the US case; McAdam 
and McAdam (2008) for the UK and Ireland. University incubators also serve as a role 
model for university students and act as an in-house (part-time) employment opportunity 
for students (see Akçomak and Taymaz (2007) for the Turkish case) .  
4. Stimulating networking among firms (e.g. Sweeney 1987; Allen and McCluskey 1990; 
McAdam et al. 2006). Tenant firms and entrepreneurs can benefit from peer groups 
effects. The idea is based on synergies among entrepreneurs who share similar problems, 
businesses and work environment. For instance, Hansen et al. (2000) argue that among 
the existing incubator models, the networked incubator (incubators in which networking 
is organized and deliberately fostered) is likely to be more successful. In a similar 
manner, Hughes et al. (2007) argue that firms’ success is related to strategic networking 
not to their mere presence in an incubator. Tenant firms network to access resources and 
to acquire knowledge.   
5. Reversing or preventing brain drain. For instance, in Israel high tech incubators were 
effectively used as a tool for absorbing immigration (Roper 1999; Frenkel et al. 2008). 
Between 1989 and 1995 more than 11.000 high skilled scientists and engineers emigrated 
from the former Soviet Union some of which were employed in incubator firms. 
Incubators can also help scientists to commercialize their work and to increase the 
financial means of scientific research. For instance, one particular goal of the Zelenograd 
Scientific and Technology Park in Russia is to make scientific work financially worth 
while to gain scientists back. Russian science has faced a within country ‘brain drain’ in 
the sense that most Russian scholars gave up scientific research for more profitable non-
scientific work such as managing western retail stores in Moscow (Bruton 1998). 
Similarly, China established ‘Innovation Parks for Returned Scholars’ to attract talented 
researchers and students who live abroad. Various subsidies are provided for returned 
scholars to set up high technology-oriented businesses in China (Chandra 2007).  
Table 1: Summary findings of the literature assessing incubator performance 
 Survival Sales growth Employment 
growth 
Innovativeness 
Physical 
infrastructure 
+ + / O O O 
Management 
support 
+ / O O O O 
Administrative 
support 
+ / O  O  O O 
Incubator image + + / O / - O O 
Financial support + / O + / O + / O O 
Networking with 
university 
O O O + / O 
Networking with 
business 
+ / O + / O + / O + / O 
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Networking with 
incubator firms 
O / - O / - O / - O / - 
Notes: (+) positive effect, (-) negative effect, (O) no particular effect. 
By looking at the above list of diversified goals it is not easy to assess incubator success. One 
issue, we have mentioned earlier, is the criteria for performance. Is it survival of the firm, 
generation of employment, growth of sales revenue, or innovativeness? Such indicators have 
been employed previously in assessing the performance of incubator tenants (see Table 1). So far 
there has not been a consensus among researchers regarding which indicators to focus on. 
Another related issue is the goals of the stakeholders. Different parties with different objectives 
are involved in an incubator and a success indicator for one stakeholder may not be an indicator 
of success for another one. For instance, in a university incubator, the survival rate is an 
important concern for the incubator management, therefore, a high survival rate can be 
considered as a success criterion. However, if this is not accompanied by an increase in the 
employment of graduates of the university in which the incubator is located, it may be 
considered as a failure from the university’s point of view. Moreover, since the opportunity cost 
of incubation is unknown it is very hard to determine whether an incubator is successful or not. 
Given the above goals we summarize the findings of the literature assessing the performance of 
incubators in Table 1.   
 
The findings of this literature for various countries are presented in Appendix table A1. We, 
therefore, highlight several points that have emerged from these studies. First, most evaluation 
studies are conducted in developed countries. There are only a few studies that quantitatively 
evaluate incubator experience in developing countries (e.g. Hsu et al. 2003; Akçomak and 
Taymaz 2007). Second, qualitative (case) studies tend to be more optimistic regarding the 
usefulness of incubators. Most studies argue that lowering start-up costs and providing assistance 
increase the likelihood of survival and create ventures and jobs. However, this is only one part of 
the study as no such information is collected concerning what would otherwise have happened if 
the entrepreneurs decided not to locate the firm in an incubator. Statistics show that survival rates 
are much lower in general for off-incubator firms. However, some studies report evidence that do 
not support overall statistics. For instance, in Germany it was found that only 3 per cent of firm 
owners would not have started their business without the existence of incubators (Tamasy 2007). 
Similarly, among a sample of 48 incubator firms only two stated that the company would have 
not existed if it were not located in an incubator (Akçomak and Taymaz 2007). On the other 
hand quantitative studies tend to report mixed evidence on performance indicators such as firm 
sales and employment growth and innovativeness. Researchers generally agree that incubators do 
have an impact on employment and sales growth. However, incubators are not found to be 
stimulating innovativeness in terms of patents, product, and process innovation. For instance, in 
a study to assess the technology transfer and commercialization of research arguments Phillips 
(2002) found that technology business incubators are only marginally beneficial and the level of 
technology transfer is much lower than expected. Third, there are only a couple of studies that 
pursued longitudinal analysis (Rothaermel and Thursby 2005a, 2005b). To assess the impact of 
incubators thoroughly, information on after-incubation is crucial. Unfortunately data availability 
significantly hinders this type of analysis. Finally, almost all studies assessing the performance 
of incubators are based on assessing firms rather than the incubator itself. However, the 
differences between firms within an incubator and between on- and off-incubator could reflect 
the motivations of the firms as well as the benefits of an incubator (Löfsten and Lindelöf 2002). 
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For instance, it may be the case that incubated firms perform better regarding economic or 
technological indicators because entrepreneurs of these firms might be more qualified (e.g. Pena 
2004).   
3 Country cases 
This section provides experiences of four developing countries in business incubation. We have 
chosen China and Brazil because these two countries together host about 1000 incubators and are 
ranked third and fourth respectively (in terms of number of incubators) following the US and 
Germany. To match China and Brazil we have selected India and Turkey. China and India are 
two emerging developing countries that are comparable in terms of their size, GDP growth, and 
potential they provide for future development. On the other hand Brazil and Turkey are accepted 
to be two promising emerging market economies and display certain similarities such as 
institutional landscape towards democracy, fully functioning market economy, macroeconomic 
instability, etc. All four countries (i) have to promote entrepreneurial risk-taking culture, (ii) have 
inhibiting institutional obstacles to entrepreneurship, (iii) have underdeveloped venture capital 
markets, and (iv) face similar difficulties in managing incubators. Given these, the evolution of 
incubators, their goals, incubation models and financing structure display considerable 
differences among countries. Appendix table A2 summarizes the incubation experience in four 
countries in comparison to the US.   
3.1 Brazil 
Brazil has more than 30 years of experience in incubation. The Brazilian incubator movement 
took off in the 1980s with the collapse of the military regime and the emergence of democratic 
institutions. The first incubator was established in 1986 and within 10 years this number 
increased to 40. The growth of the incubation business was rather slow in the first decade mainly 
due to inconsistencies between the national programme and the commitments to grow. 
According to an early assessment by Lalkaka and Bishop (1996) most incubators were located in 
a university or a research institute and more than 80 per cent of the tenants were spin-offs from 
academia and other companies. Universities played a vital role in establishing incubators. More 
importantly, they promoted the idea of incubation until incubators were accepted as a tool to 
promote entrepreneurship. In this sense one can argue that incubators in Brazil flourish as a 
product of a bottom-up process (Etzkowitz et al. 2005; Chandra 2007). At this initial stage the 
main weaknesses of the incubators were poor relations with the academic personnel and 
insufficient business support services. There were cases where incubators did not provide 
business support and consultancy services at all. Moreover some incubators provided very poor 
physical and operational infrastructure. These problems were exacerbated by institutional 
constraints to entrepreneurship, such as bureaucracy and insufficient risk-capital funding.  
Because of such deficiencies the idea of incubators as a tool to promote entrepreneurship 
emerged and developed slowly complementary to other instruments, such as Micro and Small 
Business Support Services (SEBRAE) that has various support mechanisms for small firms; 
Núcleos de Inovação Tecnológica (NITS) that aims to assist researchers in the transfer of 
technology and intellectual property; and the Ministry of Science of Technology that coordinated 
activities to provide small scale financial support and venture funds for small and new 
technology-oriented ventures. The need for a national business incubation strategy made the 
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Industry Technological Training Support Programme (PACTI) to cooperate with the National 
Advanced Technology Enterprise Promoter Entity (ANPROTEC) to establish a sustainable 
strategy to support business incubation. The incubation industry lacked a national strategy for 
quite a long time. This deficiency, contrary to expectations, established a flexible environment 
that produced different incubator models for different aims and helped Brazil to create a less 
costly development model (Etzkowitz et al. 2005). These efforts in the mid-1990s supporting the 
concept of incubation paid off quickly. Between 1995 and 1997, 33 new incubators were 
established which outnumbered the cumulative number of incubators that were established since 
1986. There are now about 400 incubators operating in Brazil. More than half of these incubators 
are technology business incubators. According to Almeida (2005) in 2003 there were over 1000 
tenant firms with more than 15.000 employees.7 The latest figures from ANPROTEC show that 
the mortality rate of incubated firms is 7 per cent compared to about 50 per cent within new 
ventures that are not incubated (Oliveira and Menck 2008).  
 
Incubators in Brazil are generally linked to universities and financed by various governmental 
and non-governmental sources, such as the National Incubation Support Program (PNI) that 
supports the creation of new incubators and assists the existing ones to expand, private 
companies and the Federation of Industries. For instance, the Federation of Industries in São 
Paulo is actively involved in operating about 10 incubators (Chandra 2007). The active 
contribution of various actors (for-profit, non-profit, and universities) is a distinct feature of 
Brazilian incubators because in most other developing countries incubators are mainly backed by 
the government. Therefore incubators in Brazil are reflections of synergies (a triple helix) among 
the university, industry, and the government (Etzkowitz et al. 2005). This synergy even had 
repercussions indirectly on innovation in general. For instance, the Innovation Law in 2005 that 
significantly improved transfer of technology and commercialization of research is an indirect 
product of this synergy.    
 
Another interesting feature of incubators in Brazil is the innovative approaches to incubation 
models. Local needs and the attempts to alleviate poverty shaped the emergence of different 
incubators and incubation models significantly. Many incubators were established as a remedy to 
unemployment aiming solely at job creation especially in traditional sectors such as agricultural 
equipment, furniture, and textile. There are even incubators that are specialized to foster 
entrepreneurship in cultural activities such as music, art, and cinema industry (Scaramuzzi 2002). 
Recently, PNI has initiated a very interesting programme that aims at sharing information, 
experience and expertise among incubators. According to this programme older and reputable 
incubators are asked to help smaller incubators (Chandra 2007). In other words, older incubators 
will incubate younger incubators. There are various other interesting and innovative programmes 
and schemes concerning incubation in Brazil.   
3.2 China 
China is a relatively newcomer to the incubation business. The first incubators were established 
in the late 1980s but the growth of the industry has been tremendous. In the first ten years 100 
incubators were established incubating about 1400 firms. The recent estimates show that there 
                                                 
7
 ANPROTEC webpage http://www.anprotec.org.br/ 
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are now more than 500 incubators in China sheltering over 600,000 employees (Chandra 2007). 
China has displayed an outstanding success regarding the expansion of the incubation 
programme. As in most other cases the government played a predominant role. Incubators in 
China offer services such as low cost office space, business support services and networking 
opportunities. However they are much bigger in size compared to their counterparts elsewhere 
(Scaramuzzi 2002). An average incubator shelters 60 to 70 firms and it is not surprising to see 
incubators with more than 150 new ventures (Harwit 2002).   
 
The entrepreneurs in China, like in any other developing country, lack financial resources and 
managerial skills. However, in the Chinese case there are two additional barriers to 
entrepreneurship: (i) the financial and institutional system which is solely dominated by the 
government, (ii) the risk-averse cultural values. The risk-averse culture not only inhibits new 
venture formation but also affects seed fund decisions of the banking and financial sector. The 
Chinese incubators have to overcome typical barriers to entrepreneurship and on top of that have 
a mission to transform societal values towards a risk-taking entrepreneurial culture. In this sense 
the Chinese government used incubators as a policy instrument to create markets especially for 
high technology products. Incubators in China are financially supported by the government via 
the Torch High Technology Industry Development Center (TORCH), under the Ministry of 
Science and Technology (MOST). TORCH is heavily involved not only in constructing 
incubators with modern infrastructure and equipment but also in operating these incubators. The 
government provides generous seed capital funds for start-ups and funds for R&D and 
innovation for small and new technology-oriented firms. But the main reason behind locating 
firms in incubators is the low cost services such as low rent, which can be 50 per cent below 
market rent and discounts on infrastructure (Harwit 2002).  
 
What makes the Chinese case special is the emphasis on innovation and technology. The 
incubation industry is strategically designed to play role in China’s transition to a high 
technology-driven market economy (Harwit 2002). As an illustration, the incubator policy was a 
core ingredient in the 10th five year plan (2001–05) of MOST. US$6 million was provided only 
for constructing incubators (Chandra 2007). As of 2002 about 40 per cent of the high tech firms 
in development areas were housed in incubators (Harwit 2002). The Chinese experience lacks 
sound and quantitative assessment but the estimates show that the transformation rate of 
scientific achievements into production increased on average from 30 per cent to 70 per cent. 
Moreover the survival of high tech ventures increased from 30 per cent to 80 per cent because of 
incubation. Currently there are various types of incubators with different models some of which 
are innovative in set-up, such as the incubators for returned overseas scholars that aim to provide 
finance and assistance for scholars who live abroad but who plan to implement their creative 
ideas in China (Ling et al. 2007).  
 
A particular weakness of the Chinese incubation programme is the dependence on the 
government. As stressed above incubators are financed and managed to a greater extent by the 
government and this dependency hinders self-sufficiency of incubators in China. Incubators are 
required to reach self-sufficiency in three years but they seldom accomplish this target. In some 
cases this dependency even affects the market orientation and behaviour of tenant firms. Because 
the exit criterion is not implemented strictly most firms tend to linger around and continue their 
risk-averse structure (Harwit 2002; Chandra 2007). Moreover, incubators who depend on the 
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government are found to be less active in providing a variety of internal and external financial 
services (Chandra et al. 2007). Another weakness of the programme is the focus on the 
‘hardware’ aspect (Lalkaka 2002). The government has invested a massive US$1.6 billion to 
construct incubators. However the intangible services that are provided by the incubators are 
poor in quality and management skills of the managers—most of who are government officials 
and have no market experience—are low. The size of the incubators is another factor that 
reduces the quality of the services. Harwit (2002) reports cases where this poses serious 
problems as it is not easy to provide similar concern for all tenants if the incubator has about 100 
tenants.    
3.3 India 
India has about 8 scientists and technical personnel per 1000 population. This number is very 
low when compared to countries such as Russia (113) and South Korea (22). However,the 
absolute numbers are more revealing to understand the potential of India: there are about 10 
million technical personnel which is almost 10 times bigger than most countries. Starting from 
the 1950s the Indian government has initiated several programmes and policies to leverage this 
talent, such as establishing prominent universities and research institutes, providing tax 
exemptions to new ventures, improving financial and venture capital markets, and the 
establishment of National Science and Technology Entrepreneurship Development Board 
(NSTED) in 1982. However, it is still not possible to argue that India is optimally benefiting 
from this large talent pool. It is true that India has build a massive science, technology, and 
research network composed of hundreds of universities, laboratories, and institutes but the 
reflection of this to entrepreneurship and new venture creation has surprisingly been limited. 
Most entrepreneurs lack necessary capabilities to manage a business, have problems in 
networking even at the regional level and last, but not least, lack financial resources. Despite 
improvements, the financial institutions provide capital on stringent conditions, such as high 
lending interest rates and demand of 110 per cent collateral security. This leads to a financing 
gap which discourages entrepreneurs. Incubators could therefore be a stimulus in turning talents 
and new ideas in to new ventures.  
 
The incubator movement in India took off in the late 1980s as a complementary policy tool 
aiming at promoting entrepreneurship and stimulating new venture creation. The take off in the 
1980s was slow because the first incubators were financed by the United Nations (UN) but 
lacked government support (Lalkaka 2002). This trend has been continuing since then and it 
seems that the incubator movement is not picking up in India. Currently there are about 50 
incubators in India (15 of which are Technology Business Incubators) when compared to about 
400 incubators in China and about 300 in South Korea. Higher education institutes are hesitant to 
support incubators and it is not easy to raise public awareness on the role that incubators could 
play. There are recent initiatives of the Department of Science and Technology together with 
other programmes like Entrepreneurship Development Cell (EDC) and Science and Technology 
Entrepreneurs Park (STEP) to set up more incubators (Saravanan 2007). These recent initiatives 
proposed by the government are (i) incubation funds that provide seed money to entrepreneurs, 
(ii) tax exemptions for services provided by technology and business incubators, (iii) priorities 
for incubated enterprises in financial markets, (iv) supporting the establishment of incubators in 
the fields of chemicals and biotechnology (implemented by the Department of Biotechnology). It 
is best to complement these efforts with campaigns that promote the concept of incubators. For 
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instance, the global forum on business incubation commenced in Hyderabad in 2006 hosting 300 
practitioners from 60 different countries which was a successful promotion attempt to raise 
awareness.  
 
Beside the government of India and the UN, the World Bank is also active in the incubation 
industry. InfoDev, a partnership of international development agencies, have been financially 
supporting five incubators countrywide: (i) IndiaCo (Mumbai), (ii) TREC-STEP 
(Tiruchirappalli), (iii) SRISTI (Ahmadabad), (iv) TeNeT (Chennai), and (v) VIT-TBI (Tellore). 
The amount of the grant reaches up to US$1.1 million. Incubators under this scheme function 
like any other technology business incubator. They offer office space, ICT facilities, and other 
incubator services to their tenants. Moreover, it is possible in some cases to receive financial 
assistance in the form of seed funding directly from the incubator (InfoDev 2008).  
What makes India rather an interesting case is that incubators constitute only a small part in a set 
of policy instruments to promote entrepreneurship. By means of various different programmes 
and mechanisms organized by the NSTED more than hundred thousands of people, researchers 
and students have received training in entrepreneurship since the beginning of the 1990s 
(Saravanan 2007). By any standards this is a big number and an applauding achievement. There 
is not a study, to our knowledge, that assesses the achievements of such policy instruments. The 
estimates and limited evaluation studies show that the incubated firms grow much faster than 
their non-incubated counterparts and the survival rates is about 80 per cent compared to only 
about 40 per cent for new ventures that are not incubated.8 Effort should be put in conducting 
sound assessment which could be a valuable asset for practitioners and policymakers worldwide. 
3.4 Turkey 
SMEs (99 per cent of all firms) possess an important place in the Turkish economy. Having 
realized this fact the government authorities have employed various policy tools to assist SMEs 
such as direct financial support, R&D subsidies, and tax allowances. As a policy tool in this 
direction, the incubator movement in Turkey started in the 1990s with a particular interest in 
technology business incubators (TBIs). The concept of an incubator was appealing because the 
risk of establishing and maintaining a high technology business is manifold in an environment 
characterized by macroeconomic instability such as Turkey.   
 
Incubators in Turkey are established by KOSGEB, which is a non-profit, semi-autonomous 
organization (under the Ministry of Industry and Trade) with the objective of improving the 
conditions of SMEs and enhancing their competitive capacity. Within the body of KOSGEB, 
there are three different schemes that can be identified as an incubator: Enterprise Development 
Centres that function as traditional incubators, Incubators Without Walls, and Technology 
Development Centres (TEKMERs) that function as university incubators. TEKMERs aim (i) to 
help people who are trained in scientific and technological fields to become entrepreneurs, (ii) to 
foster the creation of new technology-based enterprises, (iii) to foster commercialization of 
R&D, (iv) to strengthen university-industry cooperation, (v) to assist other policy initiatives that 
focus on the diversification of regional economic activities.  
                                                 
8
 From the presentation of R.M.P. Jawahar, Executive Director of Triuchirappalli Regional Engineering College–
Science and Technology Entrepreneurs Park (TREC-STEP). Accessible at 
http://www.infodev.org/en/Publication.34.html  
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TEKMERs select entrepreneurs/firms after an assessment of their projects on the basis of 
technological orientation and innovativeness. Therefore the majority of the incubator tenants are 
limited liability firms that are specialized in computer, software, electronics, medical appliances, 
and automotives. As of 2008, a total of 650 firms have benefited from incubator services, most 
of which are new technology-oriented ventures. Currently there are about 40 different types of 
incubators, 15 of which are technology incubators. Incubators provide office space and necessary 
supplies and equipment to tenant firms. Moreover firms can benefit from diversified financial 
assistance initiatives. These include (i) a support (in the form of loan) up to about 120.000 Euros 
for supplies, equipment, and prototype development, (ii) initiatives ranging from professional 
consultancy support to rent support, without repayment up to a total of about 30.000 Euros. 
Apart from these support schemes, firms can take advantage of the facilities provided by the 
universities where the incubator is located. However, the chief advantage of incubators is that 
firms receive considerable amount of tax reductions. 
 
In 2003, the performance of incubator firms was evaluated by means of conducting a 
questionnaire in six incubators in Ankara and Istanbul (Akçomak and Taymaz 2007). The study 
was based on a matched sample technique, comparing incubator firms with firms located 
elsewhere in terms of employment growth, sales revenue growth, and innovativeness.9 The main 
findings of the study are summarized below.  
 
The incubator firms were found to perform better than their counterparts located elsewhere 
regarding employment growth and sales revenue growth. The majority of the on-incubator firms 
stated an increase or no change in employment. On the contrary, one-third of off-incubator firms 
faced a decrease in employment. A considerable part of this increase is due to employment from 
the local market. For instance, 75 per cent of the firms stated that there is at least one employee 
who graduated from the university where the firm was located in. Similarly, 29 out of 48 firms 
have at least one entrepreneur (founder of the firm) who graduated from the university in which 
the firm is located. This favourable situation also holds for growth in sales revenue. More than 
60 per cent of the incubator firms faced an increase in their sales revenue. This ratio was much 
lower in firms located elsewhere. Unfortunately, the study found no statistically significant 
difference between on- and off-incubator firms regarding innovation (owning trademarks, 
patents, product, and process innovation, etc.).  
 
What makes incubator firms more successful in growth of employment and sales revenue? Three 
factors explain this difference. First, it might be the case that on-incubator entrepreneurs are 
more qualified which makes the firms they establish more successful. Second, financial 
opportunities and incubator services provided by the incubator may determine the success. Third, 
incubator firms are more likely to interact with other firms and universities and therefore can 
benefit more from network externalities. The findings reveal that entrepreneur characteristics and 
networking do not explain the differences between on- and off-incubator firms. Incubator firms 
are better linked to universities, but most of the interaction is in the form of informal contacts 
                                                 
9
 The study was an attempt to evaluate the early phase of Turkish experience in technology business incubation. 
Information on 48 on-incubator (60 per cent response rate) and 41 off-incubator firms was collected by face-to-
face interviews to compare and to contrast the firms that benefit from incubator services with those that do not. 
The data set also comprises data regarding 78 on-incubator and 61 off-incubator entrepreneurs that established 
these firms. 
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and could easily be explained by proximity to university location. Concerning the second 
argument, financial support is found to be critical for incubator firms. The detailed interviews 
revealed that unwillingness and insufficient capabilities of firms, complexity of the application 
procedure and deficiencies in the implementation hinder the full impact of the financial support 
mechanisms. An overall assessment of all incubator services show that 60 per cent of the firms 
found incubator services critically important for the survival of the firm. However, the main 
reasons of locating the firm in an incubator are the university’s image and tax benefits. Incubator 
services and networking opportunities are surprisingly among the least important reasons.  
The absence of venture capital initiatives, low levels of business networking, lack of marketing 
initiatives, and inadequate business support mechanisms appear to be among the major problems 
of the incubators in Turkey. The main source of funding in the start-up stage is own capital 
accumulation of the entrepreneur. Venture capital and spin-off processes are vital for the long 
term success of incubators but there is little improvement in venture capital markets in the last 
decade. The low level of business networking and interaction is one of the main weaknesses of 
incubators in Turkey. Only 10 per cent of the on-incubator firms stated that the reason for 
locating the business in an incubator is to network with similar firms. Unfortunately, enhancing 
business networking in incubators in Turkey is not an easy task because firms do not consider 
networking as an essential strategy. Entrepreneurs deliberately chose not to network with other 
firms due to reasons of secrecy, protection of sensitive information, and critical personnel. Last 
but not least, one of the main deficiencies of the entrepreneurs in incubators is their lack of 
experience in management. Most firms in incubators do not have viable business plans and the 
management support from the incubator deemed insufficient. 
4 Requirements for successful incubation  
The requirements for a successful incubation process could easily be analysed in a simple 
demand-supply framework. The entrepreneurs and new ventures constitute the demand side. The 
entrepreneurial actors lack managerial and marketing (and to a certain extent technological) 
know-how and demand (specialized) tangible and intangible services, administrative support, 
easier access to resources, and access to business networks. The agents on the supply side are the 
stakeholders in incubators: who is establishing incubators and for what reasons? We already 
have tried to answer these questions that also define the location and the type of the incubator. 
Business communities, local governments, and universities support new ventures and provide 
business services and technological assistance through incubators for different purposes. The 
success depends on elements of supply (exogenously), i.e. the management and funding of 
incubators, quality of services provided, clear cut defined strategies and purposes, and elements 
of demand (exogenously), i.e. how receptive are the entrepreneurs for capability building. 
However in most cases the success depends on how well the sponsors and incubator management 
can meet the specialized demand from the entrepreneurs.     
 
In the previous sections we have reviewed the literature evaluating incubators and presented four 
country examples from the developing world. What can we learn from these experiences? How 
should an incubator policy be organized to lift effectiveness? In this section we summarize the 
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requirements for successful incubation by giving short examples from experiences from the 
developed and developing world.10 Eight points are identified for successful incubation. 
 
• The purpose and the mission of the incubator should be clear: In order to provide useful 
assistance incubators should know their mission clearly (Lalkaka and Bishop 1996; Kim 
and Ames 2006). Incubators are established for different purposes from transfer of 
technology to job creation. Moreover incubators can be sector-specific assisting firms 
only in bio-technology, for instance. Knowing the mission clearly is important for the 
incubator manager to provide the right service mix for entrepreneurs. It is also vital for 
the selection of firms, entry-exit decisions and their implementation. Countries should not 
set up incubators without a strategic plan just for the sake of establishing incubators.  
• Incubators should set clear selection, entry, and exit criteria: Various studies have 
reported that the existence of clear criteria for selection and especially entry is positively 
associated with the success of the incubator. (e.g. Hackett and Dilts 2004b; Totterman 
and Sten 2005). There are many cases in developing countries that report problems in the 
implementation of this very simple rule. For instance, country studies for China (Chandra 
2007), Nigeria (Adegbite 2001), Malaysia (Yunos 2002) and Turkey (Akçomak and 
Taymaz 2007) have stated that most incubators fail to meet this criteria. In China and 
Nigeria this problem is exacerbated because tenant firms tend to remain in the incubator 
even though the incubation period has expired. This is also true for Turkey. There are 
even arguments that the incubation period should be flexible to maximize firm benefit 
because a longer incubation period might have negative impact on some tenant firms (e.g. 
Hytti and Maki 2007). Incubation provides a secure environment and may obstruct firms 
to develop certain skills, such as competition and marketing which are generally acquired 
by learning by doing.   
• Incubator managers should be qualified, preferably with a business experience: 
Managerial capacity and skills of incubator managers and staff are critical for the success 
of the tenant firms and the incubator. In almost all developing countries this is major 
problem. The incubator managers are not qualified (Kim and Ames 2006), do not have a 
business background (Lalkaka 2002) and are not business-oriented (Tamasy 2007). 
Because of such reasons, incubators are not able to provide the right service-mix for their 
tenants. They are also not able to embed firms into networks and have difficulties in 
evaluating and developing the business plan of their tenants. There is a supply shortage of 
qualified managers especially in countries where the incubator movement was fast such 
as China and Korea. The popularity of incubators increase the demand for managers but 
it is not possible to train and generate qualified incubator staff at the same speed (the 
Korean case, for instance).  
• Monitoring firms is essential for success: Monitoring and screening tenants to assess 
whether they are on the right track and whether they meet their targets is essential for 
incubation (Hackett and Dilts 2004b; Aerts, et al. 2007). Tenant firms could be assessed 
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 For a good attempt in this direction see Kim and Ames (2006). Success factors and best practices reported in 
various studies conducted by the OECD, NBIA, researchers and practitioners are summarized in this study.   
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on their performance regarding employment, sales growth, financial position, 
innovativeness, etc. Regular monitoring reveals the state of firms, their specific needs, 
and their success potential. It is the manager’s job to be pro-active in monitoring. Firms 
should be evaluated carefully on the basis of their management skills and financial 
strength before getting admitted to an incubator. This is an easy solution to minimize firm 
failure (Aerts et al. 2007). Monitoring is also one way to assess the progress of the 
entrepreneur.     
• Services that are provided by the incubator should be strategically selected: Incubator 
services (facilities and technical support) help entrepreneurs to avoid start-up cost and in 
some cases avoid start-up bureaucracy (e.g. the case of Brazil). There are direct and 
indirect externalities from pooling resources that increase efficiency. For instance, 
facilities are shared by tenants so money can be invested in other useful activities (e.g. 
Hackett and Dilts 2004b, Chan and Lau 2005). Incubators should strategically select the 
services provided and monitor their use. Asking in a self-evaluation what services are 
mostly used is not a sufficient criterion to determine the right service-mix to be offered 
for tenant-companies. Services that are not provided can be essential for firms (Allen and 
Rahman 1985), thus monitoring should also address services that are not provided to see 
whether there is need for such services. Self-assessment is important to reveal where the 
incubator stands.     
• Intangible services are much more important than tangible services: Most incubators in 
developed countries provide intangible and specialized services for tenant firms (e.g. 
networking strategy, assistance in making business plans, marketing, etc.). In developing 
countries the emphasis is on tangible services, such as office space, infrastructure, and 
laboratories. This does not mean that these services are not important. On the contrary, in 
developing countries tangible services are of utmost importance. However, in many cases 
(e.g. China, Malaysia, Nigeria, and Turkey) there has not been an optimal mix between 
tangible and intangible services that are offered by the incubators. Given the needs of the 
contemporary world, incubators should be able to provide quality and specialized 
intangible services.   
• Networking adds value only if it is a deliberate strategy: Sheltering firms and 
entrepreneurs under one roof does not guarantee beneficial effects from network 
externalities. Networking should be a deliberate strategy of the incubator and the tenant 
firms. Only in such a case one can talk of synergies (e.g. Hansen et al. 2000; Bollingtoft 
and Ulhoi 2005; Chan and Lau 2005; Totterman and Sten 2005; Hughes et al. 2007). 
Some studies have reported drawbacks of excessive networking and overflow of 
information. For instance, in a case study in Ireland, McAdam and Marlow (2007) found 
that being in close proximity to each other might have adverse affects on secrecy (e.g. 
copying and stealing ideas). In a similar manner, Akçomak and Taymaz (2007) report 
that tenant firms were hesitant to share sensitive information with other firms in the 
incubator. Most of these firms were micro firms with less than five employees and firms 
fear that their projects could be copied by the other firms by transfer of critical personnel 
and stealing ideas, for example. In these circumstances, trust is a critical factor that 
enables information exchange. 
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• The incubator should be able to self-sustain its operations: In most developing countries 
incubators are dependant on government funding one way or another. Tenant firms are 
expected to be self-sustaining after spending three or four years in an incubator. Given 
this one could also expect incubators to become independent. Self-sustenance requires 
networking, strategic planning and diversified funding sources and forces incubators to 
become more business-oriented. Just as incubators force entrepreneurs to become more 
competitive, the government may facilitate (or induce if necessary) incubators to become 
self-sustainable.   
5 Discussion and concluding comments 
The experiences of developed and developing countries in supporting incubators reveal that 
contemporary successful incubators provide a wide range of services, focus more on intangible 
business services, employ qualified managers and support staff, and are more profit-oriented. To 
match the needs of the current market economy and the requirements of the firms the concept of 
incubators has been re-invented continuously and has evolved through time. We have further 
assessed the appropriateness of incubators as a tool for entrepreneurship promotion in developing 
countries. The main weaknesses of incubators in developing countries are: (i) the focus on 
tangible service, (ii) the reliance on government both in terms of promotion and funding, (iii) the 
lack of qualified personnel and skilled managers, (iv) the lack of planning and creativeness in 
solving problems and providing services.  
 
The first three of the above could easily be observed in many developing countries but are not 
that easy to tackle. These problems are, so to say, endogenous to the system. For instance, the 
provision of high quality tangible services requires highly skilled managers and personnel which 
in turn depend on the supply of incubators and the general policy on education and training. The 
government can chose to invest lavishly on creating incubators but this investment has an 
opportunity cost which could well be a forgone investment on skilled personnel in innovation 
management. Hence the incubation industry would end up with less skilled personnel who are 
not productive and knowledgeable in providing intangible resources.  
 
The framework above is a simple example and could easily be complicated and extended. For 
example, the case of Korea fits well to this framework. The extreme increase in the number of 
incubators created a shortage for experienced managers and had a bad impact on the quantity and 
quality of the services provided by the incubators. The Chinese experience is another good 
example of policy inconsistency. Salaries of around 300 Euros per month at Fudan University 
makes self-employment tempting for university researchers. In some cases researchers spent 
more than three fourth of their time in incubators to develop their businesses and to generate a 
better income at the expense of teaching and research activities (Harwit 2002). This might seem 
acceptable if it helps to reach the target of increasing commercialization of research, however it 
has formidable drawbacks on the quality of education. Hence there is a need for an optimal 
policy regarding incubators. The bottom point is that the incubator policy should be integrated in 
a framework of policies for entrepreneurship promotion in particular, and innovation and 
economic development in general. Incubators reflect the institutional set-up, creativity, and 
policy innovativeness in a society. Policy on incubators is neither a quick fix (e.g. Allen and 
McCluskey 1990) nor a sole cure for all problems regarding entrepreneurship (e.g. Autio and 
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Klofsten 1998). Therefore it is not appropriate for policymakers who seek for fast short run 
solutions. 
 
The mere existence of incubators cannot guarantee people to become entrepreneurs and cannot 
induce networking among firms. Therefore it is best to complement incubator policy with 
policies that encourage entrepreneurship. Take the issue of education for instance. In most 
developing countries, especially in China, the risk-averse culture hinders entrepreneurship. In 
such an environment investing in education policy to create a more receptive environment that 
would promote creativity and entrepreneurship might be a better option than investing in 
incubators blindly. In a similar manner, in most developing countries financial institutions are 
also risk-averse and venture capital markets are underdeveloped, therefore entrepreneurs heavily 
rely on personal funds. Moreover, there are institutional and bureaucratic barriers that deter 
entrepreneurship. In such an environment improvements in financial institutions is the first-best 
solution to start promoting entrepreneurship.  
 
Given the evolution of the concept of incubators the policy towards incubators needs to be 
flexible and innovative itself. There is no problem in implementing incubator models that are 
borrowed from developed countries as long as they are modified according to the economic 
climate, values, and the institutional landscape of the receiving country, and firm and sector-
specific needs. Most successful incubators display a creative and innovative character in 
approaching problems of tenant companies. Incubators encourage firms to become innovative 
and competitive. Such a mission can be pursued only if incubators themselves become 
competitive, business-oriented, and innovative. There are cases where innovative models of 
incubators emerge as a response to local needs. The social incubator and the incubators 
specialized on art and culture in Brazil, and the returned scholar incubators in China are good 
examples of novel incubator models. If we accept that innovation creates value-added, the 
incubators in developing countries have to be innovative themselves to achieve their goals.  
Assessing incubator performance is not a simple task. The literature presents conflicting findings 
(Tables 1 and 2). Sound evaluation necessitates good data but data gathering is costly. However, 
evaluation should be a routine task of incubator management rather than being a once for all 
luxury. It is the only way to assess the quality of the services provided to tenant firms. Another 
reason that makes evaluation hard is the opportunity cost of incubation. As in the Chinese case, 
creating incubators needs enormous investment which could be invested in another policy tool 
that also promotes entrepreneurship. For instance, in India incubators are not very popular but 
NSTED organizes different programmes to train thousands of researchers and students to 
become entrepreneurs.  
 
An incubator is an institution as well as a tool to promote entrepreneurship and creating 
institutions is a first-best but costly solution (e.g. Bowles and Gintis 2002). Nevertheless, Rodrik 
(2008) argues that appropriate institutions for developing countries could well be second-best 
institutions that do not resemble institutions in developed countries. These could even be a mix 
of formal or informal institutions, if such an environment is conducive to investment, 
entrepreneurship, and innovation. Previous works of Fafchamps (2004) in Ghana and McMillan 
and Woodruff (1999) in Vietnam constitute good examples of such situations. They both show 
that what sustains economic transaction is relational contracting (trust, reputation, personal 
contacts) not formal legal institutions. In such cases where formal institutions are not binding, 
26 
the appropriate policy may well be strengthening these informal environments rather than setting 
up formal institutions which may be costly to establish and maintain (Rodrik 2008). To conclude, 
setting up incubators is a viable but not the sole tool to promote entrepreneurship and innovation. 
This could be achieved in various other ways and developing countries should seek novel and 
innovative policy tools as well as modify and adapt the already existing ones. 
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Appendix table A1 
Summary of findings of the literature assessing incubators 
Country Study, year 
Sample and 
methodology 
Indicator for 
success Findings 
US 
Allen and 
Rahman 
(1985) 
12 incubators, 56 firms, 
Response rate (RR) 
44%. Descriptive 
analysis.   
Physical services (work space, equipment, etc.), advertising and marketing 
services, risk management and insurance and government grants are rated 
as most useful for survival. 87% of the entrepreneurs stated that they would 
have started their business without the incubator.  
US Fry (1987) 
76 firms, RR 51%. 
Descriptive analysis. 
Comparison with 
control group.   
Incubator firms are more active in planning (business planning, mission 
statement, strategic plan, budgets, etc.) than non-incubator firms. Most 
incubators provide such services but this is more in the form of 
encouragement and only half of the incubator managers actively participate 
in the planning of the tenants. 
US 
Allen and 
McCluskey 
(1990) 
127 incubators, RR 
70%. Regression 
analysis (dependent 
variables: log of jobs 
created and firms 
graduated). 
For real estate 
incubators 
percentage of 
occupancy. For 
others jobs created 
and firms 
graduated. 
Occupancy rates around 50% show that incubators are not strong real 
estate ventures. Old incubators with accumulated expertise are more 
successful than the others. Incubators that admit light manufacturing firms 
are more successful in job creation. None of the business support services 
have significant impact on jobs created and firms graduated.   
US 
Mian 
(1996a) 
Case study of six 
university incubators 
and 47 firms. RR 32%. 
Qualitative and 
quantitative 
assessment. 
12 business 
services and 10 
university related 
services assessed 
for their usefulness.  
Shared office services are more useful than business services, such as 
assistance on applying for grants, marketing, accounting, etc. Incubator 
firms benefit from university image, student employees and university labs 
and infrastructure. Incubator services have added value contributions.  
US 
Mian 
(1996b) 
Case study of two 
university incubators in 
University of North 
Carolina and Case 
Western Reserve. 
12 different 
dimension to 
assess success in 
creating new 
enterprises.  
Sales of firms increase by about 10 and employment by 4 times within 4 
years. Physical infrastructure, student employees and faculty consultants 
are the most important services provided by the incubator (university). 
University incubator services have positive impact on growth and survival of 
tenant firms.   
US Mian (1997) 
Case study of four 
university incubators 
and 29 firms. RR 35%. 
Qualitative and 
Firm survival and 
growth and 
contributions to 
universities 
Firms in all four incubators indicate impressive sales and employment 
growth rate (150% and 35%, respectively). Incubator firms benefit from 
university image and universities receive public attention due to press 
coverage and visits to university campus. Student employees are found to 
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quantitative 
assessment. 
mission. be the most beneficial source for firms.  
Finland, 
Helsinki 
Autio and 
Klofsten 
(1998) 
Case study of two 
incubators to assess 
their management 
policies.   
Incubators are embedded in local context and their success could only be 
analyzed in the local settings. ‘Success stories’ cannot be generalized. 
Practitioners should be careful in adopting policies that are found to be 
important in other incubators.  
Switzerland 
Thierstein 
and 
Wilhelm 
(2001) 
Case study for 9 
incubators in 
Switzerland. Short 
surveys in 40 
incubators. RR 63%.   
The regional economic development aim is missing. This can be partially 
explained by the fact that contrary to most countries incubators in 
Switzerland are privately owned in most cases.  
Nigeria 
Adegbite 
(2001) 
Case study of 7 
industrial (business) 
and technology 
business incubators.   
Neither the business nor the technology incubators achieved their primary 
goals. Weaknesses: lack of objectivity in admission, insufficient support 
services. There are organizational difficulties as the incubators are 
operating under the ministry. and poor funding.  
Israel 
Shefer and 
Frenkel 
(2002) 
Quantitative evaluation 
of 21 incubators and 
109 firms. 
Firm survival, 
obtaining funding 
for projects after 
graduation. 
86.4% of the projects in the last 3 years graduated from the programme 
and 78% of them were able to secure financial support after graduation. 
The incubator manager’s skills and the selection and the monitoring of 
projects are essential for success. 
Italy 
Colombo 
and 
Delmastro 
(2002) 
45 incubator firms (RR 
20%) are matched with 
45 similar firms that are 
outside the incubators. 
Quantitative analysis 
on matched sample.  
Differences in 
employment growth 
and innovative 
activity (number of 
patents, copyrights, 
etc.)  
Italian incubators are successful in attracting high skilled entrepreneurs. 
However, there are no significant differences between on- and off-incubator 
firms regarding their innovative output. The on-incubator firms 
outperformed off-incubator firms in employment growth, education of the 
workforce, participation in EU-sponsored projects and establishing formal 
cooperative relations. 
Taiwan 
Hsu et al. 
(2003) 
Comparison between 
firms in ITRI incubator 
(16 firms 50% RR) and 
firms in other 
incubators (34 firms 
16% RR).  
Satisfaction with 
business support 
services and effect 
of clustering.    
ITRI incubator tenants are more satisfied with incubator services when 
compared to firms in other incubators. It was found that industrial clustering 
is important for the development of the incubator which implies that 
complementarities are important in local economic development.   
Finland  
Abetti 
(2004) 
Case study of 5 
incubators among 16 
incubators in Finland. A 
general assessment for 
Survival rates and 
job creation, sales 
growth.  
The survival rates reach to 95%. The incubators receive little funding from 
the government but are able to create high skilled cost effective jobs 
(government subsidy per created job is 6,450 € which is much less than the 
welfare costs per person in Finland). Average sales growth rose by 160% 
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the Helsinki region. per year during and after incubation.  
Hong Kong 
Chan and 
Lau (2005) 
Case study of 6 
incubator firms. 
Qualitative 
assessment.   
Rental subsidies and office spaces are found to be critically important for 
entrepreneurs. The training programmes are also found to be useful for 
incubator tenants. On the contrary firms indicate that they do not gain 
benefits from clustering.  
Spain 
(Basque 
country) 
Pena 
(2004) 
Quantitative evaluation 
114 firms in 9 
incubators. 
Sales growth, 
employment 
growth, and profit 
growth. 
Human capital of the entrepreneurs has significant impact on sales and 
employment growth. Most incubator services have no impact on 
performance indicators.  
US and 
Korea 
Lee and 
Osteryoung 
(2004) 
Questionnaire for firms, 
graduate firms and 
incubator managers in 
Korea and US (only 
university incubators). 
RR 62% and 45%, 
respectively. 
Perceived 
importance of 14 
items measuring 
critical success 
factors of 
incubators. 
There is significant difference between US and Korean respondents 
regarding the role of incubators strategy (clarity of goals, management, 
entry exit policies, business plans, etc.) on the performance of the 
incubator. Respondents from US give more importance to these factors. 
Financial support and business networking have more perceived 
importance than other factors. 
US 
Peters et al. 
(2004) 
Secondary data on 43 
US incubators. 
Additional survey for 
managers. 
Number of 
graduate firms. 
Graduation rates are higher in incubators that offer coaching (training and 
educational workshops) and that provide an accessible network 
(consultants, scientists, customers, other business firms, etc.). Non-profit 
incubators are found to be more successful than other incubator types 
regarding the number of firms graduated. 
Israel 
Rothschild 
and Darr 
(2005) 
Case study. 49 
interviews with 
entrepreneurs, 
workers, and 
incubators staff.  
Social links (formal 
and informal) are 
conducive to firm 
development. 
Entrepreneurs argue that affiliation with the incubator gives a reputation 
and (scientific) credibility to the firm and hence helps firms to access 
business networks and more importantly funding.  
Brazil 
Etzkowitz et 
al. (2005) 
Case study based on 
detailed interviews. 
Qualitative 
assessment.   
The most important finding is that incubators allowed Brazil to create a less 
costly development strategy that took advantage of resources, such as 
academic, available elsewhere. 
Finland 
Totterman 
and Sten 
(2005) 
Case study of 3 
incubators (3 
managers, 9 tenants 
and 9 post-incubated   
Incubator support and networking is important for firms to benefit from 
incubator resources. Incubator managers should focus on strategic 
business networking rather than only providing infrastructure and physical 
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tenants).  capital to entrepreneurs.  
US 
Rothaermel 
and 
Thursby 
(2005a) 
Panel data for 79 firms 
in Advanced Tech. 
Dev. Centre and 
Georgia Institute of 
Technology 1998–
2003. Firm survival 
The effect of a university link (licensed technology, faculty as a senior 
management, informal links.) reduces the likelihood of failure but increases 
the incubation period. These effects become stronger if the inventor is the 
founder of the firm and/or take part in the management of the firm. 
US 
Rothaermel 
and 
Thursby 
(2005b) 
Panel data for 79 firms 
in Advanced Tech. 
Dev. Centre and 
Georgia Institute of 
Technology 1998–
2003. 
Total revenues, 
total funds 
obtained, venture 
capital funding 
obtained and firm 
survival 
The effect of two mechanisms are investigated (i) transfer by a licence to 
university, (ii) backward citations of incubator firm patents to university 
patents or publications. Holding a licence is important for firm survival but 
does not have significant effect on other performance indicators. The 
absorptive capacity of the firm measured by backward citations is more 
important in explaining firm performance.  
UK 
Wynarczyk 
and Raine 
(2005) 
Surveys in 17 
incubators. 
Quantitative and 
qualitative evaluation.   
Incubators do play an important role in nurturing business and creating 
jobs. The hands on support provided by the incubator and advisors are 
found to be vital for firm survival especially in the early stages of the 
business.  
Italy 
von Zedwitz 
and 
Grimaldi 
(2006) 
Case study of 15 
incubators. Qualitative 
assessment.  
Success of 
incubator as 
regards to services 
provided 
Incubator services should be type-specific and the portfolio of the services 
provided should match with the objectives of the incubator. The incubator 
management should be sufficiently experienced to match service needs to 
incubator purpose.   
Korea 
Kim and 
Armes 
(2006) 
Information on 150 
incubator managers 
(RR 40%). Qualitative 
assessment of 
incubators and 
managers.   
Qualified incubator managers tend to provide better and specialized 
services; use wider range of support services and establish wider support 
networks. The rapid growth in the incubation business created a shortage 
of managers and hence had a negative impact on the success of 
incubators.  
US and 
Finland 
Studdard 
(2006) 
Survey of 52 firms. RR 
18%. Quantities 
analysis. 
New products, 
technological 
competence, 
reputation.  
Knowledge acquired by interacting with the incubator manager has no 
effect on new product development, technological competence and sales 
cost but it enhances the reputation (defined as increased credibility and 
marketing reference) of the firm.  
US and 
Europe Gassmann 
and Becker 
47 interviews. In 
addition 77 firms from 
the EC benchmarking   
Both the incubator and the ventures benefit from resource and information 
flows at the initial phase. The main corporation benefits at the second 
phase from intangible and tacit knowledge coming from the for-profit 
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(2006) survey  incubators and the firms. 
China 
Chandra et 
al. (2007) 
Case study of 12 
incubators. Interviews 
with managers.  
 
The fact that most incubators are large in size, high tech-oriented and rely 
on government funding made incubators dependent on government and 
weakened their capability toward market-oriented incubation. 
Israel 
Avnimelech 
et al. (2007) 
Firm level quantitative 
assessment (3747 
firms). Descriptive 
analysis. Firm survival. 
Venture capital (VC) and incubator programme are complementary. VC 
firms’ failure rate is lower than incubator firms’ failure rate. Closure rates 
are lower for firms that were established in an incubator and received seed 
funding (19% compared to 36%). 
Europe 
Aerts et al. 
(2007) 
Data from European 
Commission 
benchmarking study. 
107 incubators. RR 
18%. Survival rates. 
Tenants’ survival rate is positively correlated with the availability of a more 
balanced screening process. Reliance on one screening process (market, 
financial, management screening) is positively related to high failure rate. 
Incubators role in supporting entrepreneurial spirit by any means is critical 
for firm survival. 
Finland 
Hytti and 
Maki (2007) 
131 high tech firms 
(average RR 83%).  
Firms that are young and have growth potential benefit more from the 
incubator services. Older firms tend to be less satisfied with services. 
Incubation period should be optimal and flexible according to firm needs.  
UK 
Hughes et 
al. (2007) 
Interviews with 211 
incubator firms within a 
population of about 
1000 firms. Cluster 
analysis to classify 
firms.  
Product innovation, 
radical innovation, 
competitive 
performance.  
Firms are classified to 4 groups according to their capabilities, 
determination to access resources and to acquire knowledge. Firms that 
deliberately pursue goals in networking are more successful than others. 
Strategic networking is a crucial factor behind success and in its absence 
incubator services may not be important at all.  
Ireland  
McAdam 
and Marlow 
(2007) 
Case study of one 
university incubator. 
Detailed interviews with 
12 entrepreneurs.    
Incubator facilities, its credible status and networking opportunities are 
found to be important for tenants. However, firms were hesitant to share 
sensitive information and being close proximity to each other might have 
adverse affects (secrecy, copying idea, etc.). Trust is a critical factor that 
enables information exchange.  
Turkey 
Akçomak 
and 
Taymaz 
(2007) 
Matched sample 
assessment of 48 
incubator firms (RR 
60%). 
Sales growth, 
employment growth 
and 
innovativeness. 
There are differences between on- and off-incubator firms in terms of sales 
and employment but not in innovativeness. Tangible incubator services and 
seed funding explain this differential. 
32 
Ireland and 
UK 
McAdam 
and 
McAdam 
(2008) 
18 university incubator 
firms over 36 months.   
Tangible incubator resources are important for the development of the firm 
in the early stages. Among a set of factors networking and clustering are 
rated to be the most important factor behind firm success. 
Germany 
Schwartz 
and 
Hornych 
(2008) 
37 expert interviews in 
sector-specific 
incubators (media). 
Descriptive.   
Availability of specialized equipment and facilities are crucial for the survival 
of media firms, sector-specific knowledge and know-how. Networking is 
constrained in the incubator because companies more or less compete in 
the same sector. 
Israel 
Frenkel et 
al. (2008) 
12 incubators (6 private 
and 6 public). Surveys 
with incubator 
managers, 60 firms.    
Both private and public technology incubators promoted technological 
entrepreneurship among the immigrants from US and former USSR. Firms 
in private incubators seem to benefit from networking with (international) 
strategic partners and academia. But private incubators cannot fully 
substitute public incubators.  
 
Appendix table A2 
Comparisons between developing countries regarding incubator policies 
  BRAZIL CHINA INDIA TURKEY US 
Number of 
incubators 400 500 50 40 1000 
Strategic focus 
Mixed. Foster 
entrepreneurship, 
reduce unemployment 
transfer of technology  
High tech focus. Foster 
entrepreneurship 
High tech focus but also 
traditional incubators to 
create ventures and jobs 
High tech focus but also 
traditional incubators to 
create ventures and jobs 
Mixed. Transfer of 
technology, economic 
development  
Emergence and 
evolution  Bottom-up Top-down Top-down Top-down Bottom-up 
Scale 
Small (average 15–20 
firms per incubator) 
Big (average 60 firms 
per incubator) and 
bigger 
Small and smaller (< 10 
firms per incubator) 
Small (average 15–20 
firms per incubator) 
Small and some larger 
incubators  
Incubator 
funding 
Government, business, 
universities  Government Government Government 
Government, business, 
universities especially 
for-profit  
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Incubator 
services 
Tangible and (poor) 
intangible 
Mostly tangible and poor 
intangible 
Tangible and (poor) 
intangible 
Tangible and (poor) 
intangible 
Tangible and intangible 
with a focus on 
specialized services 
Tenant 
entry/exit 
Clear criteria and 
implementation 
Criteria is not clear and 
poorly implemented 
(especially exit criteria)  — 
Criteria is clear. 
Implementation: entry 
good but exit poor 
Clear criteria and 
implementation 
Incubator 
management  Strong Poor Poor Modest Strong 
Role of 
government  Modest level Very active Present Active  Low rather supportive 
Role of 
university Very active Present Present Active  Very active 
Institutional 
environment Developing Weak but developing Weak but developing Developing Developed 
Culture Risk-averse Risk-averse Risk-averse Modest risk-taking Risk-taking 
Note: Partially adapted from Chandra (2007). 
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